For more than fifty years, Syrian-Iraqi relations have been fraught with fear and suspicion. The case has never been as clear as it appeared under the US occupation, when the new Iraqi regime persistently accused Syria of trying to undermine its power and legitimacy.16 May 2012
| The New Middle Eastern Alignment |
| February 2012 |
|
A rapprochement between Syria and Iraq signals a new balance of power in the region. By Marwan Kabalan
In a region that is still very much dominated by a realpolitik approach and a delicate balance of power, Syria feared that a US-backed government in Baghdad would almost certainly place it between two hostile powers: Israel and a pro-US Iraq. Syria was also concerned about the possible disintegration of Iraq and the likelihood of this affecting its own Kurdish minority. The war was seen in Damascus as an attempt to reshape the political map of the region in a way that does not suit its interests. After a 24-year break, the resumption of diplomatic relations between Damascus and Baghdad in 2006 did not much improve bilateral relations. Relations between the countries only strengthened in March 2010, when Syria, under Iranian pressure, supported Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki to a second term, and several trade deals increased Syrian investment in Iraq. When the protest movement broke out in Syria a year later, Maliki, also under Iranian pressure, supported the Syrian regime, illustrating how much Iraq's position has shifted recently. Over the past few months, Baghdad has hosted several delegations of Syrian government officials and businessmen to discuss closer economic ties, including the construction of a gas pipeline that would run from Iran through Iraq to Syria. The improved relationship has both domestic and regional aspects. Domestically, Maliki is fearful that a regime change in Damascus would embolden his Sunni opponents, who have openly expressed their support for the protest movement in Syria. Following the withdrawal of US troops last December, sectarian tension ran high in Iraq. Maliki is already having troubles with his coalition partners who want to replace him or go for early general elections. Syria, on the other hand, was looking for an economic partner that could cancel the disastrous effects of Arab and EU sanctions. An implicit quid pro quo agreement may hence have been reached between Maliki and the Syrian regime, according to which Iraq would extend an economic lifeline to Damascus in return for continued Syrian support for his rule. There are reports that Syria has turned in some officials from the former Iraqi regime who had taken refuge in its territories after the collapse of Hussein's regime. Maliki had been asking for their extradition for years but to no avail. In addition, the anti-Maliki TV station Al-Raai, which had been airing from Syria, was shut down in December 2011. Last summer, Syria denied western reports that it had received aid from the Maliki government to support its waning economy. Regardless of the authenticity of this information, Syrian daily Al-Watan reported that daily Syrian exports to Iraq exceeded USD 20m in December 2011, meaning that Iraq is taking the lion's share of Syria's overall industrial production. Regionally, in this new alignment, Damascus and Baghdad have naturally, and maybe unintentionally, found themselves in one camp. Both are considered strong allies of Tehran. And both suspect that the Arab Gulf states, in co-ordination with Turkey, are attempting to bring them down. In fact, the emerging alliance between these two Arab neighbours today constitutes the cornerstone of the Iran-led axis. The other axis in this new Middle Eastern alignment is led by Turkey and includes the Arab Gulf states and Jordan. The future of the region will be defined by the outcome of this titanic conflict. Marwan Kabalan is dean of the Faculty of International Relations and Diplomacy at the University of Kalamoon. |
16 May 2012
| ||||
